It's been a while. Any insights to the problems that Ferrari had in Hungary?
It's been a while. Any insights to the problems that Ferrari had in Hungary?
I dont find stats like this all that useful. In season with 24 races per season, of course if you find yourself with the best car, you're going to rack up tons of wins in that given season that distort historic statistics.Xyz22 wrote: ↑10 Aug 2025, 12:48So McLaren has already won 10 races this year which is the same amount of wins Ferrari collected from 2020 to 2024.
They will finish the year around 20 wins, probably. In order to arrive at 20 wins for Ferrari we need to go back to mid 2017.
These results highlight the difference between a Team that worked well with the goal of winning the world championship:
- Pushed for budget cap which allowed them to compete
- Invested huge amount of money in state of the start structures
- Hired top engineers and put great talents in leading positions
People thinking that Ferrari can produce a better car than McLaren are completely delusional.
2009 would be my suggestion. Until you realise that everyone else, except McLaren, is also struggling and maybe Ferrari aren't actually as bad as everyone keep suggesting.
Leclerc is a driver. He is not seeing the information from the sensors and he cannot predict the plank wear. They have more information on the pit wall. It must be something that they think couldn't be managed with LICO. I don't think this is a situation where it's possible for the driver to make the call about how it will be managed.ScuderiaLeo wrote: ↑11 Aug 2025, 19:30With the amount of Lico they have to do, maybe P4 would've been the end result no matter what... but I wonder why they didn't communicate the plan properly? It sounds like Leclerc was completely taken aback by the choices the team made. Did they not agree on a plan beforehand? Why did Leclerc think they were doing something else?
Ferrari had a better car than RedBull in 2022. They failed to develop it as well and were also massively hindered by the mid season TD so RedBull ran with it. But it started out as a very close season.
I cut out the first part of the article which was about Vasseur's renewal, but in summary it just said the team decided stability was important and Vasseur had the full backing of the drivers.All teams “play” with tire pressures to protect skid block wear. In Budapest, there was an “inexplicable” collapse: data shows Leclerc was one second slower than the original plan.
The SF-25’s rear mechanical update was aimed at improving setup compromise, mainly by providing braking stability and better corner entry to a car overly unbalanced by an unpredictable rear end. The evolution of the rear layout, including wishbone geometry and updated internal components, delivered positive results relative to the set goals. In Hungary, pole position probably wouldn’t have been possible without the improved confidence the car can now give, with Leclerc already benefitting compared to a Lewis still in the learning phase with the previous platform. Managing floor wear will continue to force the team to seek compromises until the end of the year. The Budapest plan to keep at least one McLaren behind, taking advantage of a track layout unfavorable for overtaking, was working — until the final Hard tire set caused a collapse beyond expectations.
Reliable sources say a team typically increases pressures by up to 1.5 PSI to gain 1 mm of ride height in final stints, a practice that has become common since these cars’ downforce has grown exponentially since 2022. It’s a compromise, however, with negative effects on downforce and grip. With the final Hard set, Leclerc’s SF-25 went “out of window,” ending up one second slower than expected and losing 20 seconds in the final stint compared to simulations.
Ferrari has changed its dynamic behavior since 2024, and the floor now makes contact in unexpected areas: was the design mistake in not properly assessing how the 2025 suspension architecture would affect the floor? The SF-24 and SF-25 are aerodynamically related, but the same is not true for the chassis and suspension.
The thinking behind project 677 involved a deep mechanical redesign intended to unlock the famous aerodynamic potential — a technical choice that turned out to be “fatal.” The switch to a pull-rod front suspension in the final year of these regulations was meant to be a “calculated risk,” but it’s clear mistakes were made from the start of its development, as the car now strikes the plank with forces and in areas unforeseen by simulations, due to a lack of predictive correlation. Protecting the skid involves many measures beyond the well-known lift and coast, including raising tire pressures — something that we know for certain was done in Budapest, and which triggered the crippling of Leclerc’s No. 16 SF-25.
Thanks for sharing for free a behind paywall articleScuderiaLeo wrote: ↑12 Aug 2025, 08:14Article from Autoracer.
I cut out the first part of the article which was about Vasseur's renewal, but in summary it just said the team decided stability was important and Vasseur had the full backing of the drivers.All teams “play” with tire pressures to protect skid block wear. In Budapest, there was an “inexplicable” collapse: data shows Leclerc was one second slower than the original plan.
The SF-25’s rear mechanical update was aimed at improving setup compromise, mainly by providing braking stability and better corner entry to a car overly unbalanced by an unpredictable rear end. The evolution of the rear layout, including wishbone geometry and updated internal components, delivered positive results relative to the set goals. In Hungary, pole position probably wouldn’t have been possible without the improved confidence the car can now give, with Leclerc already benefitting compared to a Lewis still in the learning phase with the previous platform. Managing floor wear will continue to force the team to seek compromises until the end of the year. The Budapest plan to keep at least one McLaren behind, taking advantage of a track layout unfavorable for overtaking, was working — until the final Hard tire set caused a collapse beyond expectations.
Reliable sources say a team typically increases pressures by up to 1.5 PSI to gain 1 mm of ride height in final stints, a practice that has become common since these cars’ downforce has grown exponentially since 2022. It’s a compromise, however, with negative effects on downforce and grip. With the final Hard set, Leclerc’s SF-25 went “out of window,” ending up one second slower than expected and losing 20 seconds in the final stint compared to simulations.
Ferrari has changed its dynamic behavior since 2024, and the floor now makes contact in unexpected areas: was the design mistake in not properly assessing how the 2025 suspension architecture would affect the floor? The SF-24 and SF-25 are aerodynamically related, but the same is not true for the chassis and suspension.
The thinking behind project 677 involved a deep mechanical redesign intended to unlock the famous aerodynamic potential — a technical choice that turned out to be “fatal.” The switch to a pull-rod front suspension in the final year of these regulations was meant to be a “calculated risk,” but it’s clear mistakes were made from the start of its development, as the car now strikes the plank with forces and in areas unforeseen by simulations, due to a lack of predictive correlation. Protecting the skid involves many measures beyond the well-known lift and coast, including raising tire pressures — something that we know for certain was done in Budapest, and which triggered the crippling of Leclerc’s No. 16 SF-25.
There are also some illustrations by Giuliana in the original article which I can't copy over due to their reprinting policy.